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Introduction to the 2004 Editors’ 
Symposium: What Is Legal 
Interpretation? 
LARRY ALEXANDER* 
In 2004, the Institute for Law and Philosophy at the University of San 
Diego School of Law1 joined forces with the San Diego Law Review to 
host a symposium, entitled “What Is Legal Interpretation?,” the written 
product of which appears in this issue of the Review.  The symposium 
brought to campus a prominent international collection of legal theorists, 
philosophers, and theorists of language, about half of whom were 
inspired by the discussion at the symposium to write original papers 
after its conclusion for publication in this issue. 
In an earlier, though recent, issue of the Review, Professor Sai 
Prakash and I published an article on legal interpretation in which we 
defended the thesis that all interpretation properly so-called seeks to 
uncover the intended meaning of the author(s).2  (We belong to that 
much maligned camp called “intentionalists.”) Although we did not 
 *  Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. 
 1. The Institute’s Executive Directors are Professor Steve Smith of the School of 
Law and I.  The other Directors are Professors Richard Arneson and David Brink from 
the Philosophy Department at the University of California, San Diego, who also have 
appointments in our School of Law, and Professor Maimon Schwarzschild of the School 
of Law.  Affiliated Scholars of the Institute are:  from the School of Law, Don Dripps, 
Dan Rodriguez, and Chris Wonnell; from the Philosophy Department at the University 
of San Diego, Matt Zwolinski; from the Philosophy Department at the University of 
California, San Diego, Dana Nelkin and Sam Rickless; and from the Philosophy 
Department at the University of Arizona, Connie Rosati. 
 2. Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?” 
Why Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967 (2004). 




reprint our article for this issue, it was part of the readings assigned for 
the symposium, and it does appear as a foil in several of the pieces that 
follow. 
Thus, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong begins the symposium with an attack 
on the arguments that Prakash and I put forward in our article and a 
qualified defense of the “textualist” position that we had sought to 
discredit.3  He is followed by Jeffrey Goldsworthy, who criticizes the 
alternatives to intentionalism, such as literalism on the one hand, and 
“natural law” and “Dworkinian” theories of legal interpretation on the 
other.4
Sam Rickless, Kent Greenawalt, and Adrian Vermeule follow Sinnott-
Armstrong and Goldsworthy with more pluralist approaches to legal 
interpretation.  Rickless and Greenawalt take explicitly pluralistic 
approaches in which the legal author’s intentions, ordinary word 
meanings, and moral values all play a role in interpretation.5  Vermeule, 
on the other hand, is more concerned with epistemology than with 
ontology. That is, his focus is not on whether statutes mean what their 
authors meant by them (intentionalism), or whether they mean what 
textualists claim they mean, but is rather on what are the best methods 
for getting statutes’ meanings right over the full array of cases.6  He 
argues, for example, that even if one is an intentionalist, consulting all 
the evidence that bears on legislative intent may lead to more errors 
regarding that intent than, say, consulting only the text and dictionaries. 
The articles by Stanley Fish and by Steven Knapp and Walter Benn 
Michaels take up the intentionalist cudgel against the textualists like 
Sinnott-Armstrong and the pluralists like Rickless and Greenawalt.7 
Their positions in defense of intentionalism and in opposition to other 
interpretive theories are very close to the position Prakash and I 
defended and that Sinnott-Armstrong attacks.  Jeffrey Goldsworthy, in a 
second contribution to this symposium, responds to this strong 
intentionalist position with his defense of “moderate intentionalism.”8
 3. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Word Meaning in Legal Interpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 465 (2005). 
 4. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Legislative Intentions, Legislative Supremacy, and Legal 
Positivism, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 493 (2005). 
 5. Samuel C. Rickless, A Synthetic Approach to Legal Adjudication, 42 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 519 (2005), Kent Greenawalt, A Pluralist Approach to Interpretation: 
Wills and Contracts, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 533 (2005). 
 6. Adrian Vermeule, Three Strategies of Interpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
607 (2005). 
 7. Stanley Fish, There Is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629 
(2005); Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Not a Matter of Interpretation, 42 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 651 (2005). 
 8. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Moderate Versus Strong Intentionalism: Knapp and 
Michaels Revisited, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 669 (2005). 
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The final two papers do not engage in defenses of any of the various 
positions taken by the previous articles.  Dennis Patterson, instead, 
discusses an “interpretive” approach to law and legal practice generally 
rather than to the specific enterprise of assigning meanings to the 
canonical language of constitutions, statutes, administrative rules, wills, 
contracts, and so forth.9  And Miranda McGowan argues that legal 
practitioners can do without a theory of legal interpretation.10
I believe that you will find this collection of articles quite provocative 
and edifying and will agree that the 2004 Editors’ Symposium was a 
great success.  I should also say that it is the intention of the Institute for 
Law and Philosophy and the San Diego Law Review to make such 
symposia annual events at the law school.  Indeed, the 2005 Editor’s 
Symposium on The Meaning of Marriage was held in January of this 
year and produced articles that rival this collection in quality.  Those 
articles will be published in the Law Review later this year as the 2005 
Editors’ Symposium. 
In seeking to make an annual Editors’ Symposium a reality, the 
Institute and the Law Review have worked to build a permanent 
endowment sufficient to finance it.  To that end, we have solicited (and 
shall continue to solicit) donations from all former editors of the Law 
Review.  Those who have contributed to date are listed at the beginning 
of this issue.  We are very, very grateful for your generosity and hope 














 9. Dennis Patterson, Interpretation in Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV.  685 (2005). 
 10. Miranda Oshige McGowan, Against Interpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 711 
(2005). 
ALEXANDER.DOC 6/6/2005  8:37 AM 
 
464 
 
 
